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U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1990s and




1 The fact that the 2000s, which started with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, were difficult years
for the foreign policy of  the United States is  a  commonly accepted idea.  It  is  also a
banality to assert that George W. Bush’sunilateral post-9/11 foreign policy, which has
been vehemently criticized and challenged all over the world, was not the best answer to
face the volatile world situation. However, although these two points are true, they are a
bit simplistic and they tend to reduce a decade of global U.S. foreign policy to George W.
Bush’s Global War on Terror, which had a significant impact on many U.S. foreign policy
dimensions,  but  which arguably does not  reflect  the full  and complex reality of  U.S.
diversified geopolitical projection and diplomatic action.
2
While failures or relative failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear program,
withVenezuela, and difficulties with Russia, China, European allies, etc. are often evoked
 when it comes to analyzing and evaluating the U.S. foreign policy of the past decade,
other less visible or emblematic cases are almost never mentioned in the media,  nor
studied in academic circles.  This is the case of the South Caucasian region (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia), whose geopolitical importance to the U.S. is often mentioned – and,
perhaps, a bit overestimated –, but which remains, in the end, quite poorly explored by
the academic community. 
3
This certainly is something that one could regret, mostly for three reasons: the
foreign  policy  of  the  U.S.  in  the  South  Caucasus  has  been  multidimensional  and,
therefore,  complex and interesting;  it  has clearly impacted politics and geopolitics in
Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  and  Georgia,  and  it  is  therefore  indispensable  to  understand
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national and regional political and geopolitical evolutions; it shows the foreign policy of
the U.S. – particularly under President George W. Bush, but also under President Bill
Clinton – under a new light that tends to contradict a few ideas commonly accepted about
these two presidents’ foreign policies. 
4
The goals of this article are therefore twofold. First, it aims at exploring and
analyzing the active and multidimensional foreign policy the U.S. has led in the South
Caucasus since the fall of the U.S.S.R. and the independence of the Republics of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 1991. Second, it aims at identifying and discussing what the
case of the South Caucasus says about the foreign policy of Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush. More specifically, through the case of the South Caucasus, we will test two ideas
often asserted in academic literature and in the media: 1) the foreign policy of George W.
Bush was excessive and unsuccessful, and very much based on coercion; 2) the foreign
policies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were radically different.   
5
This  paper  is  divided  into  four  sections.  The  first  one  presents  the  main
characteristics of Presidents Clinton and Bush’s foreign policies as they are most often
depicted in academic literature. The next three sections analyze the goals and the main
characteristics of the U.S. policy in the South Caucasus in the 1990s and 2000s, and the
last one expands upon what the South Caucasian case brings to the global understanding
of Clinton and Bush’s foreign policies.
 
THE U.S. AND THE WORLD DURING THE 1990s AND
THE 2000s
6 The 1990s were crucial years for the foreign policy of the U.S. The end of the bipolar
world forced the U.S. to adapt to the new world geopolitical situation and it was a difficult
endeavor. President George Bush senior, “[d]espite his considerable experience, […] did
not find it easy to articulate what the U.S. role should be in the post-Cold War world.”
(Cameron  2005,  14)  After  only  one  year  in  office  following  the  Cold  War,  the  Bush
administration did much in terms of foreign policy, but did not establish any “grand
strategy” as to the role the U.S. should play on the new geopolitical scene. (Suri 2009, 620)
The task was difficult mostly because, as explained by Harvard Professor Stephen Walt,
“[…]  the  United  States  [was  left  in]  a  position  of  unprecedented  preponderance[,]
America’s  economy [was]  forty  percent  larger  than that  of  its  nearest  rival,  and its
defense  spending  equal[ed  that  of  the  next  six  countries  combined […]”  but,  in  the
meantime, “[a]lthough any number of problems merit[ed] U.S. attention, America simply
[did]  not face the sort  of  imminent geopolitical  challenge it  [had] often faced in the
twentieth century.” (Walt 2000, 65-6) Therefore, it took some time for Bill Clinton too, to
establish a “grand strategy”. Elected in November 1992, it took him a few months before
he and his team established the global framework in which his administration shaped its
foreign  policy.  The  main  points  of  what  was  to  become  the  Clinton  Doctrine  were
conceptualized in the course of 1993, mostly by Anthony Lake, Bill  Clinton’s National
Security  Advisor  and  one  of  his  closest  advisors.  In  a  September  1993  address,  he
explained that the “[…] successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of […]
enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.” (Haas 1997, 113) The
focus  was  therefore  clearly  put  on  the  economy,  with  the  idea  of  promoting  U.S.
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economic interests in the world, but the doctrine also consisted in favoring democracy
and  freedom  everywhere  U.S.  leadership  considered  it  should  be  established  and
supported, and particularly in the former Soviet Union, whose fifteen former republics
were facing major difficulties in switching from a communist system to a democratic and
free  market  based  one.  This  Doctrine  also  known  under  the  name  of  “Democratic
Enlargement” soon had a geostrategic constituent too, particularly through the NATO
enlargement objective. It also clearly accepted the idea of using military power if and
when necessary. Although some observers considered that Clinton’s foreign policy lacked
consistency and was more of “[…] a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to
specific crises […]”i, most U.S. foreign policies were driven by one or more of the above
mentioned axis and, in the end, were, according to Stephen Walt,  dominated by four
goals. “First, the administration […] sought to dampen security competition and reduce
the risk of major war in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, largely by remaining
militarily engaged in each of these regions. Second, the administration […] worked to
reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Third, it […] tried to foster a
more  open  and  productive  world  economy,  which  it  correctly  sees  as  an  important
component of U.S. economic prosperity. Fourth, the administration […] tried to build a
world  order  compatible  with  basic  American  values  by  encouraging  the  growth  of
democracy and by using military force against major human rights abuses.” (Walt 2000,
65) First viewed quite negatively by analysts of the 1990s and the 2000s,ii the foreign
policy of  the Clinton administration has  since been reassessed,iii probably in light  of
George W. Bush’s foreign policy in the 2000s, commonly perceived as a global failure. 
7
Bill Clinton enabled the U.S. to enter the new world geopolitics, and permitted
the U.S. to adapt its leadership to new realities and, in the end, to maintain it. However,
one recurrent criticism towards his foreign policy is that it did not do enough to prevent
Islamic terrorism from growing. In any case, it is often presented as radically different
from that of his successor, George W. Bush. (Leffler 2005, 395). 
8
The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center in New
York, totally changed George W. Bush’s perspectives on world affairs and on U.S. foreign
policy. It actually created perspectives for him and for his team. The violent attacks on
the World Trade Center (and on the Pentagon) killed about 3,000 civilians and made
everyone realize in the U.S. that the country had an enemy ready and able to attack not
only American interests abroad, but also the country itself. It was a shock, including for
the president, and it totally changed his vision of what U.S. foreign policy should be.
During his presidential campaign and the first months following his election, George W.
Bush did not  show a major interest  in foreign affairs  and did not  expose any major
strategy in this field. There were plans to modernize U.S. military forces and to focus on
developing free trade abroad, as well as redesigning foreign aid. But neither the president
nor the top officials (such as Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, or National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice) considered Islamic terrorism a
top  priority.  (Leffler  2011)  As  Vice-President  Cheney  put  it  in  2003,  “9/11  changed
everything,”  (“Meet  the  Press…”  2003)  in  the  sense  that  it  provided  Bush  and  his
administration with a  concrete and highly important goal  in terms of  foreign policy
(namely,  defeating  terrorism)  and  because  it  permitted  the  toughest  and  the  most
warmongering elements among Bush’s team to impose their ideas – or, at least, some of
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their ideas. “Assertive nationalists” (Daalder & Lindsay 2003, 15) such as Dick Cheney and
Donald  Rumsfeld,  allied  with  some  neoconservatives  inside  the  administrationiv who
sought  both  “the  muscular  assertion  of  American  power”  and  “the  promotion  of
democracy” (Vaïsse 2010, 3). Together, they supported and led U.S. aggressive response to
9/11, and coined it as the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). This GWOT, whose main goal
was to destroy Al Qaeda but also justified attempts to change regimes opposed to the U.S.
and to affirm U.S. diplomatic and geopolitical domination (Smith 2006, xi), complicated
U.S. relations with some of its historical allies, such as France, and considerably tarnished
U.S.  and George W.  Bush’s  image in  the  world (Chiozza 2009).  Mostly  because of  its
unilateral and bellicose stance, and because of the failure of the war in Iraq (that officially
lasted from 2003 to 2011, causing the deaths of tens of thousands people including several
thousand U.S. soldiers, and tended to create more problems than it solvedv), George W.
Bush’s foreign policy has been frequently described, and is commonly perceived, as bad
and ineffective, when it is not clearly presented as a fiasco. As one of the many examples
of this negative characterization, one can cite an article published in 2010 by Stephen
Walt, in Foreign Policy, whose title was “Delusion Points” and subtitle was “Don’t Fall for
the Nostalgia – George W. Bush’s foreign policy really was that bad.” (Walt 2010)
9
However,  these  rather  global  perceptions  on  G.  W.  Bush’s  (as  well  as  on  B.
Clinton’s) foreign policy are most often shaped according to a few emblematic cases of
their foreign action, such as US-Russia relations or U.S. policy in the Balkans in the case
of B. Clinton, and the GWOT in the case of G. W. Bush. The study of less emblematic and
less strategic U.S. foreign policies, such as the ones led in the South Caucasus, tends to
underline other aspects of U.S. foreign policy and, in the end, to show it in a different
light. 
 
MOTIVATIONS AND GOALS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE U.S. IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 
10 Although it is difficult to establish scientifically the importance of a country, of a region,
or even of a specific issue for another country, it appears to be quite essential to do so for
anybody who wants to analyze and evaluate the foreign policy of a State. 
11
In the case of the South Caucasus, one must resist the temptation to overestimate
its geopolitical significance for America, as some analysts tended to do in the 1990s and
2000s (and, to some extent, have continued to do). In other words, although U.S. officials
themselves sometimes presented the South Caucasus with emphasis and as an excessively
important region,vi it was not a top priority in Washington and no vital U.S. interests
were at stake in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. However, it obviously does not mean
that  it  was  not  important  at  all  on  the  U.S.  world  geopolitical  chessboard.  On  the
contrary, a few specificities made, and todaystill make, this region relatively significant.
12
Most  of  this  significance  either  directly  came,  or  at  least  derived,  from  its
geographical  and  geostrategic  position.  The  very  fact  that  the  Southern  Caucasus  is
located in Eurasia, this huge world region of major importance in U.S. world strategy,
made it of special importance, particularly in the years following the fall of the U.S.S.R.
Moreover,  the Southern Caucasus is not only located in Eurasia,  it  occupies a central
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position  in  Eurasia.  A  part  of  Azerbaijan  is  located  in  famous  early  20th century
geostrategist Sir H. Mackinder’s “Heartland,” which must be controlled by any power that
wants  to  dominate  world  affairs.  According  to  Zbigniew  Brzezinski,  another  famous
scholar and former President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Azerbaijan is also one of
the few Eurasian “pivots.”
13
At  the  same  time,  this  geographical  position  has  also  shaped  old  and  rich
relations between today’s Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and three major Eurasian
powers, which have counted very much in U.S. Eurasian and world strategy since WWII,
Russia,  Turkey,  and Iran.  Therefore,  from an American perspective,  the  three  South
Caucasian republics could be viewed – and, in fact, although it was rarely recognized by
U.S. officials, were viewed – in a broader framework. They could be “used” by the U.S. in
their  relations  with  Russia,  Turkey,  and Iran,  to  contain  hostile  Iran  or  favor  allied
Turkey.
14
This South Caucasian significant geographical particularity was also related to
energy  resources  and  their  transportation  towards  Western  markets.  Azeri  Caspian
subsoil have proved to be oil- and gas-rich for a long time. Therefore, at the end of the
Soviet  period,  American  and  other  Western  companies  became  interested  in  getting
involved in the production,  transportation,  and selling of these resources.  They were
openly supported by U.S. administrations, for economic but also political reasons. Indeed,
the idea was to secure Caspian oil and gas production and transportation, while breaking
the Soviet inherited Russian monopoly in this field, and also excluding Iran from it.
15
The South  Caucasus  importance,  in  the  framework of  this  “great  game”  for
geopolitical influence and for oil and gas, certainly increased with 9/11 and George W.
Bush’swar on terrorism, whose main fields were Afghanistan and Iraq. The region was
already considered as a “[…] buffer zone to contain the spread of Islamic fundamentalism
[…]”(Gorgiladze 1998, 19) in the 1990s, but the fact that it is quite close to Afghanistan and
even closer to Iraq, made this point more central in the 2000s. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia  even began to  be  considered as  interesting “support  bases”  for the military
actions led by the U.S. and its allies in these two countries. The support of these three
countries of the U.S.-led war on terrorism could also be important symbolically speaking:
they are “local” geopolitical players whose support could serve as an example. This is
particularly true for Azerbaijan,  which,  although a secular country, is  predominantly
Muslim and a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). It makes it a
special partner for the U.S. and in U.S.-led coalitions. It allows the U.S. to show that they
are not opposed to the “Muslim world” but only to Islamic terrorism. (Mathey 2004, 124)
16
Apart  from  these  mainly  geopolitical,  geostrategic,  and  geo-economic
parameters, the fact that an important ethnic lobby, the Armenian one – in addition to
other  ethnic  and non-ethnic  lobbies–  considers  the  region as  a  primary field  for  its
activities,  also  makes  the  South  Caucasus  quite  special  and  significant  from  a
Washingtonian point of view. Although they are not many in a country of about 320
million people today, the one to two million Americans of Armenian background – most
of them descendants of 1915 Armenian Genocide survivors, but a significant number of
them being more recent immigrants coming from the Republic of Armenia – are quite
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well organized in Washington, D.C. They have two lobbying organizations whose goal is to
defend and promote Armenian interests: the Armenian National Committee of America
(ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA). They also have established very
strong relations  with some political  leaders,  particularly  Congressmen,  who lead the
Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues. These Armenian lobbies and their supporters
do  not  “call  the  shots”  in  Washington  but  they,  along  with  some  other  groups  –
particularly a few related to oil and gas companies –, are quite dynamic and they have a
“resonance” capacity that tends to make the South Caucasus special to American political
leaders.
17
Therefore, in the months and first years following the independence of the three
republics,  in  1991,  the  U.S.  started to  show a  clear,  although not  dramatically  high,
interest  for  the  South  Caucasus.  Since  that  time,  the  U.S.  policy  towards  Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia has been quite active and multidimensional, if weexcept the very
beginning of this policy, under George Bush presidency (and, arguably, the past few years,
with Barack Obama).
18
Indeed, George Bush senior, who is famous for having been quite a “prudent”
president,  in  particular  with  regards  to  foreign  relations  (Howard  1998),  was  a  bit
hesitant on what attitude and policy to adopt towards the South Caucasus. U.S. leadership
happened to be – as, in fact, was the rest of the world – quite surprised by the relatively
brutal  fall  of  the U.S.S.R.  and by the independence of  the ex-Soviet republics.  In the
meantime, it had not much knowledge of nor experience in the South Caucasian region
(Hill 2001, 95), where the situation was, in the years 1991 and 1992, particularly tense and
unstable. That is probably why President Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker,
although they recognized the independence of the three republics and started formal
relations with them – by opening embassies and signing the first bilateral treaties –, did
not seem particularly keen to get really involved in South Caucasian geopolitics (Baker
1995, 629). 
19
It is under President Bill Clinton that a real South Caucasian U.S. foreign policy
started taking shape. To the contrary of President Bush, Bill Clinton decided to establish a
new – i.e. post-bipolar – global foreign strategy, the Clinton Doctrine, as previously noted.
20
This general framework had a direct impact on the South Caucasus, whose three
countries  happened  to  be  ex-Soviet  republics  that  were,  in  1993  and  thereafter,  in
political  and  economic  transition,  and  trying  to  establish  their  place  in  the  new
international  community.  In  the  meantime,  the  U.S.  could  not  ignore  a  few  South
Caucasian  specificities  that  we  developed  above,  related  to  oil  and  gas  resources  or
geostrategy, and these parameters also contributed to shape the making of the U.S. South
Caucasian policy.
21
Consequently, a general policy, which one could arguably call a “strategy,”vii was
defined.  Officially,  its  main  objectives,  as  presented  in  1996-1997  by  Strobe  Talbott,
former Deputy Secretary of State, in a series of speeches, were the following: supporting
political  and economic reforms in these countries,  contributing in resolving regional
conflicts, supporting energy security, and promoting American companies commercial
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interests. (Hill 2001, 101) As we will discuss in detail in the last section of this article,
these objectives did not change much after the election of George W. Bush, as former
State Department Deputy Assistant  in charge of  the South Caucasus,  Matthew Bryza,
explained in 2006, although security issues, probably because of 9/11 and the Global War
on  Terror,  were  considered  more  central  (“Caucasus:  U.S.  Says…  ”  2006).  This  U.S.
strategy also had, although denied by U.S. officials but recognized by most observers, a
geopolitical aim, in the sense that it was taking place in the context of a “great game”
with  Russia.  Indeed,  at  least  from  1996-1997,  Russia  was  struggling  to  maintain  its
influence over areas where the U.S. and other powers (such as, in the case that interests
us, Iran, Turkey, and the E.U.) were trying to gain some. 
22
In order to reach its objectives in the South Caucasus, the U.S. soon got involved
in regional geopolitics and soon started a geopolitical penetration of the region. The main
manifestations of this penetration were the financial assistance provided to the three
republics, democracy promotion, military assistance and cooperation, energy policy, and
diplomatic involvement in the resolution of regional conflicts. 
 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, DEMOCRACY PROMOTION,
AND MILITARY COOPERATION, AS MAJOR TOOLS OF
U.S. GEOPOLITICAL PENETRATION IN THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS
23 As early as 1992,  the U.S.  started a policy of technical,  humanitarian,  and,  above all,
financial assistance to the three republics.  Although this assistance to Azerbaijan was
considerably reduced, because of the war between Azerbaijan and Karabakhi Armenians
for the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and because of the pressures from the U.S. Armenian
lobby, Armenia and Georgia became major U.S. foreign aid receivers. 
24
This  assistance was mostly implemented through the Foreign Assistance Act,
amended in 1992 by Section 201 of the Freedom Support Act,and was mostly distributed
via USAID. Through this umbrella, according to several official documents, Georgia has
received more than $ 3 billion and Armenia has received more than $ 2 billion since 1992.
As an example, in 2003, Armenia received $ 89.7 million, corresponding, this same year, to
21.3% of  its  annual  budgetviii.  This  logic  of  financial  assistant  started by  the  Clinton
administration  was  continued  and  developed  under  Bush.  Indeed,  in  2004,  another
foreign aid agency was created, the Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and Armenia
and  Georgia  were  among  the  first  countries  chosen  to  be  part  of  this  financial  aid
program. They were both involved in a five-year program, called a “compact,” mostly
focusing on agriculture, communication, and energy networks, which came to an end in
2011, and which was then renewed for Georgia, but not for Armenia. In the meantime,
traditional annual assistance through the Freedom Support Act tended to decrease and
has been considerably reduced these past few years under the Obama administration’s
impetus. This significant aid in the 1990s and 2000s accompanied Armenia and Georgia’s
efforts  towards  democracy  and  a  better  economic  situation,  and  promoted  a  rather
positive  image  of  the  U.S.  in  Armenia  and  Georgia.  It  has  therefore  facilitated  a
progressive rapprochement between the U.S. and the two South Caucasian republics. In
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the  meantime,  it  has  also  induced some dependency between the two republics  and
Washington,  and it  has  turned out  to  be  an efficient  tool  for  the U.S.  that  could,  if
necessary,  stop  its  financial  assistance  –  either  momentarily  or  for  good.  It  is  what
Washington decided to do after the serious political and social troubles following the
contested election of Serge Sarkissian, in 2008, as Armenian President, by cancelling some
of the MCC Compact funding(“U.S. Cuts Millennium Challenge… ” 2009). On the contrary,
the U.S. momentarily, but drastically, increased assistance to Georgia, after the 2008-war
against Russia, to show its support of Tbilisi.
25
Another important aspect of U.S. South Caucasian policy of the 1990s and 2000s
was the promotion of democracy. It was particularly true during the George W. Bush
presidency, but not only. It was sometimes related to the above mentioned foreign aid,
because some funding was directed towards justice  system reforms,  decentralization,
promotion  of  civil  society  involvement  in  political  life,  particularly  through  NGOs,
support to the media, etc. It was also particularly visible during 2003 Rose Revolution in
Georgia. Although American officials denied having directly supported regime change in
Georgia (Warner 2003), it is a proven fact that the U.S. played at least an indirect role in
the events that,  at  the end of  2003,  allowed opposition leader Mikhail  Saakashvili  to
overthrow  then  president  Eduard Shevardnadze  and  to  become  president  (after
democratic  elections  in  January  2004).  As  specialist  Lincoln  Mitchell  explains  it:  “By
encouraging and helping to develop coalitions through hosting roundtables between the
parties, facilitating discussions, providing ongoing advice to leaders of opposition parties
supporting study trips to Poland […] and to Serbia […], and other means, U.S.-funded
organizations  were becoming involved in politics  in a  way that  went  beyond simply
providing technical  support for fair  elections […].” (Mitchell  2010,  123)  After Mikhail
Saakashvili peacefully came to power, notably thanks to massive street demonstrations,
the George W. Bush administration did not criticized this “non-violent coup d’État” and
started  to  vibrantly  support  the  new  regime,  openly  pro-Western  and  opposed  to
Moscow. This support then continued but became less vibrant and more discreet after the
Russian-Georgian  war  of  2008.  Still,  the  U.S.  did  not  stop  their support,  even  when
democracy and Human Rights were openly challenged by Tbilisi (Mitchell 2008). In the
same vein, U.S. officials did not seem to think much of diverse and frequent restrictions
of freedom recorded in Azerbaijan, where President Heydar Aliev handed over power to
his son Ilham in 2003. The fact that Georgia is a strategic ally and Azerbaijan an energy
ally of  the U.S.  probably tends to make Washington more complaisant towards these
regimes.
26
Indeed, both Georgia and Azerbaijan have been firmly included in major U.S.
projects since the 1990s and even more this past decade. The two countries are very close
NATO partners,  Georgia  even having been very close to  getting a  MAP (Membership
Action Plan, the very last step before full integration to the Atlantic Alliance) in 2008.
Armenia  is  also  involved  in  many  NATO  programs  but,  contrary  to  Azerbaijan  and
Georgia, Armenian leadership has always been very clear that the goal for Armenia was
not to become a member of NATO. The three countries also participated in the global
fight against terrorism led by the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks. This is particularly true for
Georgia, whose participation to the war in Iraq was significant – up to 2,000 Georgian
soldiers  were  active  on the ground (“Georgia  to  withdraw… ”  2008) – but  also  for
Azerbaijan, which was the first country, where the majority of the population is Muslim,
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to send troops to Iraq, although in very small number. In the military field, the U.S. also
succeeded in controlling and using several radar stations in Azerbaijan (“The U.S. and
Azerbaijan” 2004; “Iran is not Worried… ” 2006) and became directly involved in Caspian
Sea affairs thanks to the “Caspian Guard,” a “[…] program launched by the United States
in 2003 [that] helped Azerbaijan (and Kazakhstan) to build naval security forces to protect
critical  infrastructure  as  well  as  to  prevent  illegal  trafficking  and  smuggling  in  the
Caspian.” (Valiyev 2012, 3) It also actively participated in building the Georgian military,
particularly through the 2003-2004 Train and Equip Program (GTEP) that, among other
things,  permitted the creation and training of  four light  infantry battalions and one
mechanized armored company, thanks to a $64 million funding (Gularidze 2004). The U.S.
also provided annual military financial assistance to the three republics that in particular
has permitted training and officers meetings.
 
ENERGY POLICY AND CONFLICTS RESOLUTION, AND
THE AFFIRMATION OF U.S. PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS
27 The economic constituent of U.S. foreign policy in the South Caucasus was important as
well. It has mostly concerned energy issues because Azerbaijan is an oil- and gas-rich
country, and because South Caucasian territories had to be used in order to transport
Caspian  and  Central  Asian  resources  towards  Western  markets,  bypassing  Iran  and
Russia. The U.S. was firmly involved in this field, particularly since the mid-1990s. After
major efforts on the part of U.S. diplomacy, and thanks to a determined involvement of
President  Clinton  himself  (“Speech  of  the  President…  ”  1998),  the  “contract  of  the
century” was signed in 1994. As a result, Western energy companies gained control of
Azeri Caspian oil fields and their presence in the new consortium was significant (about
45% of the shares). The British company BP was slightly dominant, with a 17,127% share,
followed  by  the  American  company  Amoco,  17,010%.  (Yérasimos  1996,  118)   Russian
Lukoil, traditionally dominant in this area, got a 10% share, which it sold a few years
later, and Turkish State-controlled TPAO got 6,75%. (Jafalian 2004, 152) After some time,
BP, which merged with Amoco, became the major player in this consortium and, since
that time, it has played a “special” role in Azerbaijan economic, but also political and
geopolitical life. (Lussac 2010, 25) This “contract of the century” was a major success for
U.S.  diplomacy.  However,  it  was  only  a  first  step.  The  next  step  was  to  secure  the
transportation of this oil from Baku towards western markets, bypassing Russia and Iran.
After a few more years of diplomatic efforts,  the U.S.-supported B.T.C.  (Baku-Tbilissi-
Ceyhan) pipeline was built. This 1,009 mile long tube, the economic profitability of which
was really not sure when the contract to build it was signed, was open in 2005. It passes
through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, and bypasses Russia and Iran, but also Armenia,
because of an Azerbaijani veto.ix BP was dominant in the consortium that built it and that
has operated it, by up to more than 30%, but the U.S. companies’ share in the B.T.C. is
significant (13,26%, including 8,4% for Chevron, 2,5% for ConocoPhilips, and 2,36% for
Hess).  (Jafalian 2004,  161)  Qualified in  2005 by State  Department  spokesman Richard
Boucher as a “major success,” (Arvedlund 2005) the B.T.C. has permitted the U.S. to affirm
itself as a major South Caucasian geopolitical player. The U.S. also got involved in other
South Caucasian oil  or  gas pipeline construction,  and it  supported,  in the 2000s,  the
Nabucco project,  the idea of which was to build a gigantic gas pipeline from Baku to
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Austria. This project, whose estimated cost was $ 7.9 billion, reached quite an advanced
stage in the second half of the 2000s, but was finally abandoned in 2013. (Tirone 2013)
28
Finally,  another field where the U.S.  South Caucasian policy was quite active
during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush eras, was the one of the resolution of regional
conflicts.  With  the  end of  the  U.S.S.R.,  few very  serious  conflicts  (re)started,  mostly
between regions that wanted to secede and the central powers of the about to become –
or newly-born – republics. The most critical ones were, and still are today, the ones in
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. has never been influential in
the resolution of Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. These two conflicts, which were
armed conflicts between 1991 and 1993, took place in the north of Georgia, at the border
with Russia. Moscow has therefore always been firmly involved in them, supporting the
two seceding regions on the one hand and playing the role of arbitrator on the other. The
U.S.  position on these conflicts  has always been clear and has not  changed much in
twenty years: it is opposed to Abkhazian and South Ossetian secessions, and also to the
resumption of military violence. However, it has never been able to play an effective role
in the peace negotiations following the wars that permitted Abkhazia and South Ossetia
to formally secede from Georgia – whose central power never accepted this secession.
Washington only played an indirect and very limited role, through the UN and the OSCE
(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) in the 1990s and 2000s. After the
August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia, the situation became even
more frozen and the role of the U.S. in it became even more insignificant. Russia won the
five-day war and consequently officially recognized the independence of the Republics of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Even though the Obama administration still maintained this
issue  on  its  diplomatic  agenda  (U.S.  State  Department  2010),  the  situation  is  totally
blocked today and the U.S.  cannot do much about it.  The situation is  quite different
concerning the Karabakh conflict. The region, located during the Soviet period in the
Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, but composed of a large majority of ethnic Armenians, has
separated,  de  facto,  from Azerbaijan  since  the  end  of  the  Soviet  era  and  in  a  more
established way after the war ended in 1994. This war caused several thousand deaths and
created about one million refugees (about 700,000 Azeris and 300,000 Armenians). Since
that time, the conflict has been considered frozen – although soldiers are quite frequently
shot along the front line – and the U.S. has been co-president, with Russia and France, of
OSCE Minsk Group, in charge of the peace negotiations. Although they have not been able
to find a solution, the three co-presidents have been quite active. They have tried to
prevent  war  from  resuming  and  to  bring  the  two  parties  to  a  compromise.  They
apparently almost succeeded in doing so several times, particularly during negotiation
talks in Key West, in 2001, under U.S. impetus (Reeker 2001). The U.S. is often considered,
particularly by Armenians, to be close to the Azeris, but it has, apparently, always tried to
be constructive and to find a compromise acceptable for both parties.x In the same vein,
the  U.S.  also  tried  to  get  effectively  involved  in  a  hypothetical  Armenia-Turkey
rapprochement, without much success. It tried to use its influence and the fact that it was
close  to  both Ankara  and Yerevan –  despite  the  fact  that  the  U.S.  executive  branch
refused to recognize the Armenian Genocide of 1915 –, to play a role of “go-between” and
conciliator. It supported a process of track-two diplomacy symbolized by the creation of
the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) that encouraged discussions
between leading Turkish and Armenian figures between 2001 and 2004, and then became
really active in the 2008-2009 state-to-state normalization process between Turkey and
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Armenia. This process led to the signature of protocols between Armenian and Turkish
ministers of Foreign Affairs in 2009, but these protocols were not ratified, then, by the
two  countries’  parliaments.  Although  this  was  a  failure  for  the  U.S.  and  their
international partners, this important attempt showed the crucial role the U.S., along
with other partners such as Russia or the European Union, could play in this affair.
 
ON THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE CLINTON AND
BUSH FOREIGN POLICIES AND ON THEIR GLOBAL
EFFICIENCY
29 The foreign Policy of the U.S. in the South Caucasus in the 1990s, and maybe even more in
the 2000s, is an interesting example of an – at least relatively – coherent, efficient, and
successful American foreign policy. It is quite difficult to assert that President Clinton’s
administration established a very sharp and well-defined strategy towards the region, but
it  drew a  few important  lines,  particularly  regarding  the  geopolitical  importance  of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia from an American viewpoint and the objectives that
should drive U.S. foreign policy. These objectives, the major characteristic of which is to
be quite well “calibrated” and not too ambitious, and the subsequent policies, did not
change significantly in the 2000s. Although President George W. Bush’s war on terrorism
somewhat intensified U.S. regional policy, it was not structurally disrupted. 
30
The efficiency and the  success  of  a  foreign policy  are  extremely  difficult  to
formally and scientifically establish. First, because the results of a policy are, most of the
time, hard to measure and debatable, and secondly, because they depend much on the
objectives to be reached, and these objectives are not always clear and moreover not
always stated by the authorities in charge of it. In the case of the South Caucasus, we have
argued that the goal of the U.S. was to geopolitically penetrate the region – a region it
had no contact with and no expertise on before the end of the U.S.S.R. – and to gain
influence in it.  It  does not  seem that  the goal  of  the U.S.  was to become the hyper
dominant or possibly only regional geopolitical power, but rather to establish a strong
foothold  there  thanks  to  political,  economic,  and  diplomatic  levers  (that,  one  could
assume, could be activated if necessary). If such an analysis is right, we can therefore
consider  that  the  U.S.,  under  Presidents  Clinton  and  Bush,  reached  their  goal.  The
different policies implemented permitted the U.S. to be firmly involved in every aspect of
South Caucasian geopolitics  (including  resolution of  conflicts  and the  energy  sector)
without, at least “flagrantly,” trying to totally exclude other geopolitical players, be it the
ones to which it is close but which could also be competitors (Turkey or the EU) or the
ones with which it has strained relations (Russia and Iran). It, apparently, opted for not
putting too much pressure on the three South Caucasian countries but assisted them and
seemed to stand next to them when needed. This U.S. “smart” geopolitical penetration
also, arguably, enabled these countries not to become totally dependent on one power (as
had been the case during most of the history of these peoples and territories).  
31
If these considerations could appear relatively coherent with what we know of
Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, this is not what was necessarily expected from George W.
Bush’s foreign policy, at least according to most perceptions we had and still have of his
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foreign policy. This does not necessarily lead to reassessing it. As far as foreign policy is
concerned, the legacy that President Bush left to his successor is commonly considered
very  negative.  This  is  not  only  because  of  the  GWOT,  but  also  because  the  Bush
administration did not solve the Iranian and North Korean nuclear questions, tended to
neglect the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, did not ameliorate relations with Russia (on the
contrary,  they  worsened  in  the  2000s),  and  made  the  U.S.  less  “popular”  and  less
respected in the world (Laïdi 2012, 21). However, the case of the South Caucasus tends to
show that Bush’s foreign policy could differ very much from one region to another and
from one question to another. In other words, it implies that Bush’s foreign policy was
more complex and less monolithic than it was and still is often depicted. The foreign
policy of the U.S. was and still is global and it is therefore difficult and risky to qualify it
in broad terms, without studying each and every one of its aspects, including the less
“famous” and the less “visible” ones.
32
The  fact  that  the  foreign  policy  of  George  W.  Bush  in  the  South  Caucasus
functioned quite well and reached its goals, is as noteworthy as the fact that it resembles
considerably  Bill  Clinton’s  and  that  it  presents  more  elements  of  continuity  than
elements  of  change.  While,  as  we  explained  above,  it  is  difficult  to  affirm that  the
different institutions involved in this U.S.  South Caucasian policy have systematically
coordinated a formal “strategy” in the South Caucasus, the different policies led by the
US all sought at “carefully” and gradually gaining influence in the region. And this logic,
as well as the policies used to implement it – sometimes by the same officials, particularly
in the State Department –, did not change much between both presidents and between
the  different  administrations  of  these  two  presidents.  For  example,  the  Clinton
administration  started  using  the  financial  assistance  provided  to  the  three  South
Caucasian countries (and particularly to Armenia and Georgia) as an important foreign
policy “tool,” but the Bush administration continued in the same way. The assistance
through the Freedom Support Act and the U.S.A.I.D. tended to decrease in the 2000s but
this decrease was counterbalanced by the integration of  Armenia and Georgia in the
Millenium  Challenge  Program.  The  same  thing  occurred  in  terms  of  democracy
promotion. Both administrations were quite active in this field. The Bush administration
was the one which supported regime change in Georgia in 2003 and which supported
Mikhail Saakashvili and his pro-democracy rhetoric, however the Clinton administration
also  focused  on democratization.  Gerard  Libaridian,  who was  an  adviser  to  the  first
Armenian president, Levon Ter Petrosyan, in the 1990s, explains: “During my tenure, for
instance, Armenia’s democratic and economic reforms were the principal concern of the
international community, and especially the United States.” (Libaridian 1998, 8) As for the
strategic and military components of the U.S. South Caucasian policy, the rapprochement
was  clearly  initiated  in  the  1990s,  thanks  to  bilateral  policies  and  via NATO,  and
continued, approximately in the same way, in the 2000s. One could have assumed, with
regard to the GWOT and the then growing tensions with Iran and with Putin’s Russia, that
George W. Bush would try to intensify military cooperation with the South Caucasian
countries but it was not really the case. One could also have assumed that its will to assert
U.S. military force all over the world would push the Bush administration to militarily
support Georgia during the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, but it did not. The fact
that Clinton’s and Bush’s foreign policies in the South Caucasus resemble each other does
not mean that these two presidents had identical visions of what foreign policy should be
and how it should be practiced. The South Caucasus is only one case study, one example
U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1990s and 2000s, and the Case of the South Caucasu...
European journal of American studies, 10-2 | 2015
12
of U.S. foreign policy, and the conclusions drawn from it cannot necessarily be applied
generally. However, whereas they do not prove that the foreign policy of Clinton and
Bush was identical, they show that some aspects of it were not very different. They also
show that the “Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy” (to cite the subtitle of Daalder’s and
Lindsay’s  book)  did  not  apply  to  all  and  did  not  affect,  or  significantly  affect,  all
dimensions of U.S. foreign policy. 
33 *   *   *
34 In less than two decades, the U.S. has succeeded in geopolitically penetrating a region it
did not know much about before its independence from the U.S.S.R. in 1991. The U.S. did
not impose itself as the sole world power dominating the region’s geopolitics, but that is
probably not what U.S. authorities sought. However, the U.S. gained solid political and
geopolitical levers in the three South Caucasian republics and could become an important
regional player, without taking much risk and without, in the end, putting so much into it
(if we compare it with other countries or sectors of U.S. foreign policy). It could become
so, first because the position of the U.S. in the South Caucasus was (and still is today)
quite “comfortable.” Its vital interests were and still are not at stake in the region and,
from the beginning, it has been in the position of a strong “challenger,” which did not
absolutely have to become the dominant player, but which worked on consolidating its
position in order to be influential and powerful when and if  necessary. The U.S.  also
gained solid influence in the region because the policies it implemented there, both under
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, were quite well “calibrated” and quite efficient. They
were  also  coherent  and  consistent  over  time.  Indeed,  we  observed  that  both  the
“strategy” and the “combination” of policies implemented in the course of the 1990s and
the 2000s remained quite the same. The efforts on the financial assistance, the promotion
of democracy, the Caspian energy policy, the military cooperation, and the resolution of
conflicts, were all started by the Clinton administration and continued by Bush, mostly
following similar patterns.
35
Because of this active and efficient foreign policy of the U.S. and, also, of other
actors such as Iran, Turkey, the European Union, and some European countries, the South
Caucasian geopolitical situation considerably evolved in the 1990s and 2000s. Today, the
South  Caucasus  and  the  three  countries  that  compose  it  are  not  under  the  unique
influence or domination of Russia (or the U.S.S.R.) or of another single power – as they
have often been throughout history. Although Russia remains a – and in fact the – major
player, and although their relations with foreign countries still are, most of the time,
asymmetrical, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, now tend to depend not only on one
power but on several. It sometimes puts them in quite uncomfortable situations, but it
also, at least potentially, multiplies their geopolitical options. 
36
As  for  recent  developments  of  U.S.  South  Caucasian  foreign  policy,  many
observers  point  out  that  Barack Obama,  who has  refocused the foreign policy of  his
country on some critical issues and on Southeast Asia, has disengaged the U.S. from the
South Caucasus. It appears to be true but it also seems that the Obama administration has
done it gradually, without brutally stopping all the programs and all the cooperation with
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Although some regret that the Obama administration
is not more active in the South Caucasus, the U.S. still holds quite strong positions, and
political, diplomatic, economic, and military leverages, most of them inherited from the
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Clinton and Bush eras, and this is a situation with which U.S. leadership seems to satisfy
itself.
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November 19, 2009.
iv. Among  these  high-ranking  neoconservative  officials,  one  can  cite  Paul
Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of  Defense),  Douglas Feith (Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy),  Abram Shulsky (in charge of  Iran in the Department of
Defense),  John  Bolton  (Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Arms  Control  and
International Security Affairs), Elliott Abrams (in charge of the Middle East at
the National Security Council), Lewis Libby (one of the main advisers of Vice-
President Cheney), and David Wurmser (Cheney’s advisor for the Middle East)
(David 2011, 526).
v.  See,  for  example:  Ricks,  Thomas E.  2006.  Fiasco.  The American Military
Adventure in Iraq, New York: The Penguin Press. 
vi.  For exemple, in 1997, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott called the South Caucasus
and Central Asia “a strategically vital region.” Sonia Winter, “Central Asia: U.S. Says Resolving
Conflicts A Top Priority,” RFE/RL, June 9, 1997.
vii. Although it is quite difficult to affirm that the different institutions involved in this U.S.
South Caucasian policy (mainly the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Congress,
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and the USAID) have coordinated a “strategy” in the South Caucasus, the different policies led by
the US all seem to follow a same rationale whose main idea was to gain influence in the region.
viii.  For  a  detailed  presentation  and  analysis  of  U.S.  financial  assistance  to
Armenia, cf. Zarifian 2006.
ix.  This veto was due to the conflict over the Karabakh region, between Azerbaijan and Karabakh
Armenians, supported by Armenia.
x.  Author’s  interview  with  Henri  Jacolin,  French  co-president  of  the  Minsk
Groupe from 2002 to 2004, Paris, February 12, 2009.
ABSTRACTS
The foreign policy of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations in the South Caucasus
(Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia)  shows  U.S.  foreign  policy  under  a  rather  positive  light.  With
consistency and continuity, they were able to implement a multidimensional realistic foreign
policy, the main manifestations of which allowed the U.S. to gain, in a few years, solid political,
economic, military, and diplomatic leverages. Its vital interests were not at stake in the region
and, from the early 1990s onwards,  it  has been in the position of a potent “challenger” that
worked  on  consolidating  its  position  in  order  to  be  influential  and  powerful  when  and  if
necessary. Although it did not become the sole dominant regional power, the U.S. succeeded,
mostly in the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, in strongly geopolitically
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